Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, University of Bergen and Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Norway
Abstract
Considered here are equilibria, notably those that solve noncooperative games. Focus is on connections between evolutionary stability, concavity and monotonicity. It is shown that evolutionary stable points are local attractors under gradient dynamics. Such dynamics, while reflecting search for individual improvement, can incorporate myopia, imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality/competence.
Publisher
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
Subject
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science
Cited by
18 articles.
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