Affiliation:
1. Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal
Abstract
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε–perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing from the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of perfect equilibria: A strategy f is a perfect equilibrium in such a game G if and only if it is an 1/n–perfect equilibrium in Gn for all n, where {Gn} stands for our approximation sequence.
Publisher
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
Subject
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science
Cited by
5 articles.
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