REVERSE AUCTION: THE LOWEST UNIQUE POSITIVE INTEGER GAME-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

REVERSE AUCTION: THE LOWEST UNIQUE POSITIVE INTEGER GAME

Published:2007-12 Issue:04 Volume:07 Page:L439-L447
ISSN:0219-4775
Container-title:Fluctuation and Noise Letters
language:en
Short-container-title:Fluct. Noise Lett.

Author:

ZENG QI¹,DAVIS BRUCE R.²,ABBOTT DEREK²

Affiliation:

1. Faculty of Economics and Commerce, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia

2. School of Electrical & Electronic Engineering, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia

Abstract

A reverse auction can be likened to a tendering process where a contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This is in contrast to a conventional forward auction where the highest bidder wins. In this paper we analyze a minority game version of the reverse auction where an extra condition is imposed that, namely, the bid must be unique. In other words, the bidder with the lowest positive unique integer (LUPI) wins. We examine and compare two extrema, namely, the case when all players are rational and the case when all players make random selections.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

General Physics and Astronomy,General Mathematics

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219477507004069

Reference12 articles.

1. COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS

2. Toward a study of bidding processes part IV - games with unknown costs

3. Auctions

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