Mandatory Corporate Governance Rules and Auditor Behavior: The Case of Greece

Abstract

This study examines the impact of the first mandatory corporate governance regulation in the Greek environment on audit quality. Audit quality is operationalized with the number of audit qualifications, the monetary amount of audit qualifications, audit hours, and audit fees. It also utilizes the full content of the Greek audit report and constructs new audit quality proxies while it is the first that examines the association between corporate governance and actual audit hours. The findings suggest that following the implementation of the new regulation, auditors became more independent during the audit opinion process. Furthermore, the audit fee increases without audit hours showing a respective increase. It is concluded that the audit fee increase does not reflect differentiation in the delivered audit quality, as auditors do not exert more audit effort. The audit fee increase could reflect a risk premium due to the increase in auditors’ perceived business risk as a result of the increased spending and additional liability of listed companies under the new regulation.