Top Management Team Fault Lines and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

Abstract

Synopsis The Research Problem This study examined whether and how top management team (TMT) fault lines formed by diversity and division affect stock price crash risk (hereafter, crash risk). Motivation Prior studies have documented how a single characteristic or the demographic diversity of managers affects real economic activities. However, TMT fault lines, formed by the structure of executives’ demographic diversity, remain untapped in crash risk research. Given the potential monopoly of the TMT on information, it is important to determine whether TMT fault lines influence the distribution of bad news. This study therefore explored how TMT fault lines reduce crash risk through the private leakage of bad news by subgroups and the moderating role of analysts in this process. The Test Hypotheses We hypothesized that firms with a strong TMT fault line have low stock price crash risk. Moreover, subgroups divided by TMT fault lines have a greater chance of leaking bad news when firms are followed by more analysts, thereby reducing the stock price crash risk to a greater extent. Target Population We examined 19,228 annual observations of Chinese publicly listed firms from 2008 to 2021. Adopted Methodology We applied ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and moderation analysis to our study. Analyses We evaluated the microgovernance factors affecting crash risk from a novel perspective — internal TMT conflict. First, we performed regression analysis on a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms to determine whether TMT fault lines reduce crash risk and the effect of analysts on this relationship. Second, we performed cross-sectional variation tests for the main regression. Finally, we investigated the effect of a CEO-CFO coalition on crash risk, given that the unequal status of subgroups may reduce the monitoring capacity of any subgroup in a weaker position. Findings We found that TMT task-related fault lines are negatively associated with crash risk and positively moderated by analysts. Meanwhile, the TMT biodemographic fault lines do not have a significant influence on crash risk. We also demonstrated that the monitoring effect of TMT task-related fault lines is stronger when external governance is weaker. Finally, additional analysis implies that the monitoring effect of a CEO-CFO coalition fault line remains effective, but this effect is weaker.