VOTERS' FICKLENESS: A MATHEMATICAL MODEL

Abstract

This paper presents a spatial agent-based model in order to study the evolution of voters' choice during the campaign of a two-candidate election. Each agent, represented by a point inside a two-dimensional square, is under the influence of its neighboring agents, located at a Euclidean distance less than or equal to d, and under the equal influence of both candidates seeking to win its support. Moreover, each agent located at time t at a given point moves at the next timestep to a randomly selected neighboring location distributed normally around its position at time t. Besides their location in space, agents are characterized by their level of awareness, a real a ∈ [0, 1], and their opinion ω ∈ {-1, 0, +1}, where -1 and +1 represent the respective intentions to cast a ballot in favor of one of the two candidates while 0 indicates either disinterest or refusal to vote. The essential purpose of the paper is qualitative; its aim is to show that voters' fickleness is strongly correlated to the level of voters' awareness and the efficiency of candidates' propaganda.