The analysis of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game based on weighting effect

Abstract

In this paper, an improved evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model is proposed by considering the weighting effect. Taking into account individual’s perceived payoff (benefits), the evolutionary tendency of the cooperators and three equilibrium points of the proposed model are obtained. We then numerically investigate how different exterior and interior factors influence on individuals’ cooperative behavior and their payoff both in the ER random network and the BA scale-free network. Our results reveal that the heterogeneous network structure is conducive to cooperation. In addition, the existence of leader nodes is an important driving force for promoting individuals’ cooperation. By further analyzing the rationality coefficient which appears in the weighting function, we obtain that a greater of irrationality could lead more people to take cooperative strategies. Finally, two indicators which are used to measure the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are defined. The results show that the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are larger in the heterogeneity network than that in homogeneous network.