Affiliation:
1. Scuola Superiore di Catania, Catania, I-95123, Italy
2. Dipartimento di Fisica e Astronomia, Universitá di Catania, and INFN, Sezione di Catania, Catania, I-95123, Italy
Abstract
A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the so-called "Stubborn individuals and Orators" (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose further generalizations that can be implemented.
Publisher
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
Subject
Computational Theory and Mathematics,Computer Science Applications,General Physics and Astronomy,Mathematical Physics,Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
Reference13 articles.
1. Computers in Science and Engineering;Stauffer D.,2003
2. S. Fortunato and D. Stauffer, Extreme Events in Nature and Society, eds. S. Albeverio, V. Jentsch and H. Kantz (Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2006) p. 231.
3. CHANGING OPINIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN SOCIOPHYSICS
4. Complex networks: Structure and dynamics
Cited by
58 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献