Evolutionary Game Models of Cooperative Strategies in Blockchain-Enabled Container Transport Chains

Abstract

This paper describes the interaction between major and auxiliary container transport carriers (MCs and ACs) by using evolutionary game theory models, enabling them to cooperate and share information under sufficient penalties and incentives. The MCs are generally logistics service integrators, mega shipping companies, and port authorities, which affect the regulations and technology innovation much, while the ACs are rest carriers and logistics service providers. Evolutionary games are used to study the cooperative behavior between MCs and ACs in the shipping industry. As indicated by analytical studies, the cooperation between MCs and ACs will be invalid without introducing blockchain technology for adequate supervision. In peak season, an evolutionary equilibrium incurs between MCs and ACs under cooperation or non-cooperation behavior strategies. However, in off-seasons, the evolutionary equilibrium is unique in which both parties choose not to cooperate. When introducing blockchain technology for supervision, the carriers will cooperate in peak and off-seasons. Besides, through a simulation analysis of the established models, the results show that the introduction of blockchain technology can enable carriers to form cooperative alliances, resolve inefficient operations, and achieve a long-term stable equilibrium strategy. We can also apply the results for reference to the regional shipping industry.