A New Cost-Sharing Scheme for Cleaning Up Polluted Line-Structure River

Abstract

Cleaning up a polluted river requires coordinated actions among different firms along the river. The key to promoting and enriching the firms’ cooperation is to share the pollution cleanup cost among these firms fairly and reasonably. In this paper, we propose a new cost-sharing scheme, called the entire upstream agents compensation method (the EUAC method for short), for a line-structure river cleanup cost-sharing problem by considering the waste transfer rate for each river segment. On the one hand, we offer a re-allocation scenario in order to implement the EUAC method. On the other hand, to reveal the rationality and stability of this proposed method, we formulate a cooperative cost game for the line-structure river cleanup cost-sharing problem, and show that the EUAC method coincides with the Shapley value of this game and belongs to the core of this game.