Pricing Competition Under Specific Discrete Choice Models

Abstract

Recent developments of information technology have increased market’s competitive pressure and products’ prices turned to be paramount factor for customers’ choices. These challenges influence traditional revenue management models and force them to shift from quantity-based to price-based techniques and incorporate individuals’ decisions within optimization models during pricing process. Multinomial logit model is the simplest and most popular discrete choice model, which suffers from an independence of irrelevant alternatives limitation. Empirical results demonstrate inadequacy of this model for capturing choice probability in the itinerary share models. The nested logit model, which appeared a few years after the multinomial logit, incorporates more realistic substitution pattern by relaxing this limitation. In this paper, a model of game theory is developed for two firms which customers choose according to the nested logit model. It is assumed that the real-time inventory levels of all firms are public information and the existence of Nash equilibrium is demonstrated. The firms adapt their prices by market conditions in this competition. The numerical experiments indicate decreasing firm’s price level simultaneously with increasing correlation among alternatives’ utilities error terms in the nests.