Time to Stop? An Empirical Investigation on the Consequences of Canceling Monetary Incentives on a Digital Platform

Author:

Zhang Dongcheng1ORCID,Jiang Hanchen2,Qiang Maoshan3,Zhang Kunpeng4ORCID,Qiu Liangfei5ORCID

Affiliation:

1. CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China;

2. School of Government, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;

3. Institute of Project Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;

4. Department of Decision, Operations and Information Technologies, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland at College Park, College Park, Maryland 20742;

5. Department of Information Systems and Operations Management, Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611

Abstract

Practice- and Policy-Oriented Abstract Digital platforms commonly use monetary incentives to motivate users to perform specific tasks. Existing studies have shown the effects of introducing such monetary rewards on task participation and performance on public platforms. However, little is known about the impact of canceling rewards, and particularly less attention is paid to corporate platforms. Our study examines the impact of canceling monetary incentives using quasi-natural experiments on a corporate platform. We find that canceling monetary incentives is not simply the reverse process of their introduction. Specifically, compared with the increase in task participation when rewards were initially introduced, canceling these rewards leads to a sharper decrease in participation. Additionally, although introducing rewards has no significant effect on task performance, canceling rewards causes a significant decline in performance. These results suggest that canceling monetary rewards has a net negative impact on task participation and performance. Furthermore, we examine the heterogeneity of this impact concerning user motivation types and working competency levels. We also discuss the similarities and differences between corporate and public platforms in the impact of monetary incentives. Our results provide important practical implications for enterprise information systems and general information systems regarding their design of incentive strategies.

Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

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