Affiliation:
1. Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080;
2. Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
Abstract
By providing quick and easy access to credit, online lending platforms may help borrowers overcome financial setbacks and/or refinance high-interest debt, thereby decreasing bankruptcy filings. On the other hand, these platforms may cause borrowers to overextend themselves financially, leading to a “debt trap” and increasing bankruptcy filings. To investigate the impact of online lending on bankruptcy filings, we leverage variation in when state regulators granted approval for a major online lending platform—Lending Club—to issue peer-to-peer loans. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that state approval of Lending Club led to an increase in bankruptcy filings. A complementary instrumental variables analysis using loan-level data yields similar results. We find suggestive evidence that the ease of receiving a Lending Club loan causes some borrowers to overextend themselves financially, leading to bankruptcy. Our results suggest that recent initiatives from online lending platforms to control how borrowers use loans, such as Lending Club’s “balance transfer loans” that send loan funds directly to creditors, can help these platforms provide safe and affordable credit. Our study adds to the literature that examines how online platforms influence society and the economy; it contributes to the literature that examines how financial products, services, and regulations influence bankruptcy filings; and it has policy implications for online lending design and regulation. This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Subject
Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management
Cited by
18 articles.
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