Team Incentives, Social Cohesion, and Performance: A Natural Field Experiment

Author:

Delfgaauw Josse12ORCID,Dur Robert1234ORCID,Onemu Oke5,Sol Joeri26ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3062 PA Rotterdam, Netherlands;

2. Tinbergen Institute, 1082 MS Amsterdam, Netherlands;

3. Leiden University, Faculty Governance and Global Affairs, 2511 DP The Hague, Netherlands;

4. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research (CESifo), 81679 München, Germany;

5. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 53113 Bonn, Germany;

6. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Business School, 1018 TV Amsterdam, Netherlands

Abstract

We conducted a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance increases with the team’s social cohesion because social cohesion reduces free-riding behavior. In addition, team incentives may lead to more coworker support or to higher peer pressure and thereby, can affect the team’s social cohesion. We introduced short-term team incentives in a randomly selected subset of stores and measured for all stores, both before and after the intervention, the team’s sales performance and the team’s social cohesion as well as coworker support and peer pressure. The average treatment effect of the team incentive on sales is 1.5 percentage points, which does not differ significantly from zero. In line with theory, the estimated treatment effect increases with social cohesion as measured before the intervention. Social cohesion itself is not affected by the team incentives. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

Subject

Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management

Cited by 15 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3