Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208
Abstract
In a foundational paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced the deferred acceptance algorithm that achieves a stable outcome in a two-sided matching market by letting one side of the market make proposals to the other side. What happens when both sides of the market can propose? In “Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains,” Dworczak answers this question by constructing an equitable version of the Gale–Shapley algorithm in which the sequence of proposers can be arbitrary. The main result of the paper shows that the extended algorithm, equipped with so-called compensation chains, is not only guaranteed to converge in polynomial time to a stable outcome, but—in contrast to the original Gale–Shapley algorithm—achieves all stable matchings (as the sequence of proposers vary). The proof of convergence uses a novel potential function. The algorithm may find applications in settings where both stability and fairness are desirable features of the matching process.
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Subject
Management Science and Operations Research,Computer Science Applications
Cited by
2 articles.
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