Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games

Abstract

In large distributed systems, ensuring the efficient utilization of the available resources is a very challenging task. Given limited information regarding the state of the system and no centralized control over the outcome, decentralized scheduling mechanisms are unable to enforce optimal utilization. To better understand such systems, some classic papers that introduced game theoretic models used the “price of anarchy” measure to evaluate the system’s performance. The paper “Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games” by Christodoulou, Gkatzelis, and Sgouritsa overcomes some of the overly pessimistic results shown in this prior work by enhancing the scheduling mechanisms with access to some additional information regarding the state of the system: a “resource-aware” mechanism knows what machines are available in the system and uses this information to carefully incentivize the users toward more efficient Nash equilibrium outcomes.