Affiliation:
1. Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham TW20 0EX, United Kingdom;
2. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Abstract
Fix a Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, the lottery over outcomes that arises under the random matching mechanism is identical to the lottery that arises under random serial dictatorship, where the order of dictators is uniformly distributed. This result extends the celebrated equivalence between the core from random endowments and random serial dictatorship to the grand set of all Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy matching mechanisms.
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Subject
Management Science and Operations Research,Computer Science Applications,General Mathematics
Cited by
14 articles.
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