Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games

Published:2020-08 Issue:3 Volume:45 Page:889-895
ISSN:0364-765X
Container-title:Mathematics of Operations Research
language:en
Short-container-title:Mathematics of OR

Author:

Renault Jérôme¹,Ziliotto Bruno²^ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Toulouse School of Economics, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, 31000 Toulouse, France;

2. Centre De Recherche en Mathématiques de la Décision, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSL Research Institute, Université Paris-Dauphine, 75016 Paris, France

Abstract

We study the limit of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to one, in non-zero-sum stochastic games. We first show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges. We then provide two-player examples in which the whole set of equilibrium payoffs diverges. The construction is robust to perturbations of the payoffs and to the introduction of normal-form correlation.

Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

Subject

Management Science and Operations Research,Computer Science Applications,General Mathematics

Reference28 articles.

1. Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

2. Long-Term Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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