Strategy-Proof Multidimensional Mechanism Design

Author:

Basu Ranojoy1ORCID,Mukherjee Conan2ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Economics and Development Studies Area, Indian Institute of Management Udaipur, Udaipur 313001, India;

2. Economics Group, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata 700104, India

Abstract

We consider direct mechanisms to sell heterogeneous objects when buyers have private additive valuations and nonunit demand. We completely characterize the class of strategy-proof and agent sovereign mechanisms that satisfy a local side-flatness condition. Further, we introduce a notion of “continuity up to utility” and show that any such mechanism allocating all objects at all profiles is continuous and anonymous only if it is efficient. We find that the only mechanism satisfying these properties is equivalent to operating simultaneous second-price auctions for each object—as was done by the New Zealand government in allocating license rights to the use of radio spectrum in 1990. Finally, we present a complete characterization of simultaneous second-price auctions with object-specific reserve prices in terms of these properties and a weak nonbossiness restriction.

Publisher

Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

Subject

Management Science and Operations Research,Computer Science Applications,General Mathematics

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