Abstract
AbstractNeuroimaging studies have suggested an important role for the default mode network (DMN) in disorders of consciousness (DoC). However, the extent to which DMN connectivity can discriminate DoC states – unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and minimally conscious state (MCS) – is less evident. Particularly, it is unclear whether effective DMN connectivity, as measured indirectly with dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of resting EEG can disentangle UWS from healthy controls and from patients considered conscious (MCS+). Crucially, this extends to UWS patients with potentially “covert” awareness (minimally conscious star, MCS*) indexed by voluntary brain activity in conjunction with partially preserved frontoparietal metabolism as measured with positron emission tomography (PET+ diagnosis; in contrast to PET-diagnosis with complete frontoparietal hypometabolism). Here, we address this gap by using DCM of EEG data acquired from patients with traumatic brain injury in 11 UWS (6 PET– and 5 PET+) and in 12 MCS+ (11 PET+ and 1 PET-), alongside with 11 healthy controls. We provide evidence for a key difference in left frontoparietal connectivity when contrasting UWS PET– with MCS+ patients and healthy controls. Next, in a leave-one-subject-out cross-validation, we tested the classification performance of the DCM models demonstrating that connectivity between medial prefrontal and left parietal sources reliably discriminates UWS PET– from MCS+ patients and controls. Finally, we illustrate that these models generalize to an unseen dataset: models trained to discriminate UWS PET– from MCS+ and controls, classify MCS* patients as conscious subjects with high posterior probability (pp > .92). These results identify specific alterations in the DMN after severe brain injury and highlight the clinical utility of EEG– based effective connectivity for identifying patients with potential covert awareness.Author SummaryOur study investigates the role of the Default Mode Network (DMN) in individuals with disorders of consciousness (DoC), such as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) and minimally conscious state (MCS). Previous neuroimaging studies have suggested a role for the DMN in DoC, but its ability to differentiate between UWS and MCS remain unclear.Using advance brain imaging and modelling techniques, we analyzed data from DoC patients with traumatic brain injury and healthy controls. Our findings reveal a key difference in left frontoparietal connectivity when comparing UWS to MCS patients and healthy individuals.To validate our results, we employed a robust cross-validation approach, which demonstrated that the connectivity between frontal and left parietal brain regions reliably discriminates UWS patients from MCS patients and controls. Furthermore, we extended our analysis to include patients with potential covert awareness, showcasing the clinical utility of our findings. We successfully classified these patients as conscious with high accuracy.This research significantly contributes to our understanding of the DMN in DoC and highlights the potential use of electroencephalography-based connectivity analysis in clinical settings. By identifying specific alterations in the DMN after severe brain injury, our study may aid in the accurate diagnosis and management of individuals with disorders of consciousness, potentially improving their overall outcomes.
Publisher
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
Reference90 articles.
1. Consciousness and Anesthesia;Science,2008
2. Regional brain volumetry and brain function in severely brain-injured patients
3. Ashburner, J. , Barnes, G. , Chen, C. , Daunizeau, J. , Moran, R. , Henson, R. , Glauche, V. , & Phillips, C . (2017). SPM12 Manual The FIL Methods Group (and honorary members). Functional Imaging Laboratory, 475–1. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-294X.2006.02813.x
4. Brain Metabolism but Not Gray Matter Volume Underlies the Presence of Language Function in the Minimally Conscious State (MCS): MCS+ Versus MCS− Neuroimaging Differences;Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair,2020
5. Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. NY: Cambridge University Press.