Vaccine Stockpile Sharing For Selfish Objectives

Abstract

AbstractThe COVAX program aims to provide global equitable access to life-saving vaccines. However, vaccine protectionism by wealthy nations has limited progress towards vaccine sharing goals. For example, as of April 2022 only ∼20% of the population in Africa has received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose. Here we use a two-nation coupled epidemic model to evaluate optimal vaccine-sharing policies given a selfish objective: in which countries with vaccine stockpiles aim to minimize fatalities in their own populations. Despite the selfish objective, we find it is often optimal for a donor nation to share a significant fraction of its vaccine stockpile. Mechanistically, sharing a vaccine stockpile reduces the intensity of outbreaks in the recipient nation, in turn reducing travel-associated incidence in the donor nation. This effect is intensified as vaccination rates decrease and epidemic coupling increases. Despite acting selfishly, vaccine sharing by a donor nation significantly reduces transmission and fatalities in the recipient nation. Moreover, we find that there are hybrid sharing policies that have a negligible effect on fatalities in the donor nation compared to the optimal policy while significantly reducing fatalities in the recipient nation. Altogether, these findings provide a rationale for nations with extensive vaccine stockpiles to share with other nations.