Avicenna’s Treatment of Analogy/Ambiguity and its Use in Metaphysic

Abstract

This paper discusses Avicenna’s concept of ambiguity/analogy and argues that while Avicenna doesn’t mention it explicitly there is an analogy of the predication of being between creatures and God, the Necessary of Existence. A consequence of this analogical predication is that for Avicenna, like Aquinas, God does not fall under the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being. If the predication were univocal as some scholars contend such as Timothy Noone and Olga Lizzini, then God would fall under the subject of metaphysics, common being as he does according to Ramon Guerrero and John Wippel. This paper has three parts. First, it discusses the comparison between Avicenna and Aristotle on pros hen equivocation/analogy. Second, it discusses the texts within Avicenna which suggest an analogical predication and which can reasonably be seen as establishing a transcendental predication between God and creatures. Finally, it develops the consequences of Avicenna’s view for the relationship between God and the subject of metaphysics common being or being qua being and argues that God does not fall under common being.