Affiliation:
1. Rutgers University, USA
Abstract
Abstract
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Reference44 articles.
1. Varieties of Privileged Access;Alston;American Philosophical Quarterly,1971
2. Epistemic Freedom Revisited;Antill;Synthese,2020
3. Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions;Berker;Philosophical Review,2013
4. The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism;Berker;Philosophical Issues,2013
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献