Affiliation:
1. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology , 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
Abstract
Abstract
If there are vague propositions, then the question arises whether it is rational to care intrinsically about the vague. This paper argues—contraBacon (2018), the most comprehensive defence of vague proposition to date—that it is. Some things, such as pain, may be rational to care intrinsically about only if precise, but some things, such as truth, are rational to care intrinsically about even if vague.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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