Influential individuals can promote prosocial practices in heterogeneous societies: a mathematical and agent-based model

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we examine how different governance types impact prosocial behaviors in a heterogenous society. We construct a general theoretical framework to examine a game-theoretic model to assess the ease of achieving a cooperative outcome. We then build a dynamic agent-based model to examine three distinct governance types in a heterogenous population: monitoring one’s neighbors, despotic leadership, and influencing one’s neighbors to adapt strategies that lead to better fitness. In our research, we find that while despotic leadership may lead towards high prosociality and high returns it does not exceed the effects of a local individual who can exert positive influence in the community. This may suggest that greater individual gains can be had by cooperating and that global hierarchical leadership may not be essential as long as influential individuals exert their influence for public good and not for public ill.