Affiliation:
1. Princeton University USA
Abstract
Abstract
Orthodox decision theory is fanatical in the way it treats small probabilities of enormous value, if unbounded utility functions are allowed. Some have suggested a fix, Nicolausian discounting, according to which outcomes with small enough probabilities should be ignored when making decisions. However, there are lotteries involving only small-probability outcomes, none of which should intuitively be ignored. So the Nicolausian discounter needs a procedure for distinguishing the problematic cases of small-probability outcomes from the unproblematic ones. In this paper, I present a dilemma for Nicolausian discounting: the view must be coupled either with a procedure that delivers fanatical verdicts of its own, as bad as those of orthodox decision theory, or with one that entails intransitive cyclic preferences.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Reference23 articles.
1. A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values;Beckstead,2021
2. Kantian decision making under uncertainty: dignity, price, and consistency;Bjorndahl;Philosophers’ Imprint,2017
3. Pascal’s mugging;Bostrom;Analysis,2009
4. Costs of abandoning the sure-thing principle;Briggs;Canadian Journal of Philosophy,2015
5. Risk and Rationality