Affiliation:
1. University of Oxford UK
Abstract
Abstract
Legal discourse consists largely of legal claims. These are claims that there is a legal obligation, legal right, or other legal incident. What is the meaning of “legal obligation”, “legal right” and so on in legal claims? The standard view among philosophers of law is that “legal” indicates that, according to law, there is a moral obligation, moral right or other moral incident. Here I set out a new objection to the standard view. The objection is that the standard view is unable to account for the use of legal claims in some common forms of logically complex arguments.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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