Justification and being in a position to know: reply to Waxman

Abstract

Abstract Daniel Waxman (2022a) argues that the thesis, recently advanced in Rosenkranz 2021, that one has propositional justification for φ, if and only if one is in no position to rule out that one is in a position to know φ, has clear counterexamples. However, Waxman makes controversial assumptions about the notion of being in a position to knowthat I should and coherently can reject. On the alternative construal of the notion open to me, Waxman’s strategy to produce counterexamples founders. However, this line of response has repercussions for two further theses I defend, viz.that propositional justification and its absence each are luminous. It is shown what more needs to be argued in order to avert a corresponding threat to the latter.