Abstract
Abstract
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Reference45 articles.
1. Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries
2. ‘Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia’;Blanchard;IMF Economic Papers,2001
3. ‘Xi says China must adapt to "New Normal" of slower growth’;Bloomberg,2014
4. ‘Quitters never win: the (adverse) incentive effects of competing with superstars’;Brown;Journal of Political Economy,2011
5. ‘Tournaments and office politics: evidence from a real effort experiment’;Carpenter;American Economic Review,2010
Cited by
129 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献