Reconciling transparency, low Δ0-complexity and axiomatic weakness in undecidability proofs

Abstract

Abstract In a first-order theory $\varTheta $, the decision problem for a class of formulae $\varPhi $ is solvable if there is an algorithmic procedure that can assess whether or not the existential closure $\varphi ^{\exists }$ of $\varphi $ belongs to $\varTheta $, for any $\varphi \in \varPhi $. In 1988, Parlamento and Policriti already showed how to tailor arguments à la Gödel to a very weak axiomatic set theory, referring them to the class of $\varSigma _{1}$-formulae with $(\forall \exists \forall )_{0}$-matrix, i.e. existential closures of formulae that contain just restricted quantifiers of the forms $(\forall x \in y)$ and $(\exists x \in y)$ and are writable in prenex form with at most two alternations of restricted quantifiers (the outermost quantifier being a ‘$\forall $’). While revisiting their work, we show slightly less weak theories under which incompleteness for recursively axiomatizable extensions holds with respect to existential closures of $(\forall \exists )_{0}$-matrices, namely formulae with at most one alternation of restricted quantifiers.