From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

Published:2019-03-08 Issue:5 Volume:29 Page:595-604
ISSN:0955-792X
Container-title:Journal of Logic and Computation
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Visser Albert¹

Affiliation:

1. Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the second incompleteness theorem from Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth.

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Subject

Logic,Hardware and Architecture,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Software,Theoretical Computer Science

Link

http://academic.oup.com/logcom/advance-article-pdf/doi/10.1093/logcom/exz004/28828118/exz004.pdf

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2. Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting;Feferman;Fundamenta Mathematicae,1960

3. Perspectives in Mathematical Logic;Hájek,1993

4. Models of Peano Arithmetic. Oxford Logic Guides;Kaye,1991

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