Multinational security coalitions and the limits of middle power activism in the Middle East: the Saudi case

Abstract

Abstract This article examines Saudi Arabia's decision in recent years to use novel and hitherto unexplored informal alliance formats, which we term multinational security coalitions (MSCs). This development was initiated by the new Saudi political leadership under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who have a much greater inclination to pursue proactive foreign and security policies than their predecessors. However, it will be highlighted that beyond the priorities of individual personalities, this shift in Saudi Arabia's behaviour occurred against the backdrop of significant changes in the existing security environment, including the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the security affairs of the region during the presidency of Barack Obama, and crucially also Saudi Arabia's frustration over the failure of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to develop into a viable security mechanism. The article begins with the introduction of the key ideas relating to institutional design, the conceptual framework for this study. Section two outlines the most important reasons for Saudi Arabia's choice of the MSC format. The third section examines the strengths of the MSC format—especially informality, the resulting low entry-thresholds and the low risk of entrapment—that provided Saudi Arabia with partial and temporary success in recruiting coalition partners and thus bolstering its leadership role. The final section demonstrates, however, that ultimately MSCs are not a panacea. The informality of MSCs that makes it easy for the pivotal state to assemble a coalition also makes it hard for it to forge, and enforce, a common vision.