Affiliation:
1. Stanford University, USA
2. University of Innsbruck, Austria
Abstract
Abstract
In matching models, pairwise-stable outcomes do not generally exist without substantial restrictions on both preferences and the topology of the network of contracts. We address the foundations of matching markets by developing a matching model with a continuum of agents that allows for arbitrary preferences and network structures. We show that pairwise-stable outcomes are guaranteed to exist. When agents can interact with multiple other counterparties, pairwise stability is too weak of a solution concept, and we argue that a refinement of it called tree stability is the most appropriate solution concept in this setting. Our main results show that tree-stable outcomes exist for arbitrary preferences and network topologies.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
2 articles.
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