Regulating Risk and Autonomy in Assisted Suicide: Conway V Secretary of State for Justice

Abstract

Abstract Noel Conway appealed against the dismissal of his claim in the High Court, that section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961 is incompatible with his Article 8(1) ECHR right to respect for private and family life. Mr Conway’s appeal concerned three main issues: first, the correct way the court should respond to Parliament’s decision not to amend section 2(1) Suicide Act; secondly, the way the Divisional Court addressed Mr Conway’s alternative scheme; and thirdly, the weight to be placed upon personal autonomy. The Court of Appeal held that Parliament is better placed for determining the purported legal rights relating to assisted suicide. The court also concludes that there is evidence for the potential of indirect coercion or undue influence if assisted suicide is permitted. The comment draws out the court’s basic presumption in analysing the efficacy of Mr Conway’s alternative scheme to protect the weak and vulnerable. The comment also argues the level of acceptable risk used by the court in assessing Mr Conway’s scheme—a 100% success rate—is overly-cautious and inconsistent. Finally, the comment goes on to show that courts still have problems, in end-of-life cases, in understanding how ethical principles operate in determining true propositions of law.