Abstract
Abstract
Suppose that a defendant’s conviction would amount to an interference with their right to peaceful protest, protected by articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Is a court then obliged to make a conviction turn on a fact-sensitive proportionality assessment justifying the interference? Drawing on the jurisprudence of the domestic and Strasbourg courts, this article argues that the case law has crystallised into two paradigms that provide distinct answers: the ‘justificatory paradigm’ in European human rights law and the ‘offence-centric’ paradigm in domestic law. The article exposes how and why this divergence has developed, what is at stake at the level of constitutional values and how this conflict might be resolved. It is argued that compliance with Strasbourg now depends on the integration of the justificatory paradigm into domestic law. The article imagines how this might be done in a manner sensitive to domestic constitutional values, using the mechanics on offer in the Human Rights Act 1998.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)