Reducing and Managing Risk: The Dimensions of Strong Ceasefires in Intra-State Conflict

Abstract

Abstract This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the strength of ceasefires in intra-state conflict. The framework is based on the perspectives of ceasefire practitioners. The practitioners view the essence of ceasefire design as the reduction and management of risk, which ranges in severity from violations to complete breakdown of the ceasefire agreement. The framework identifies three determinants of ceasefire risk: the design's objective quality, being the extent to which the ceasefire arrangements reduce and manage risk; the design's subjective quality, being the parties’ satisfaction with these arrangements; and the will of the parties to end the conflict through negotiations. Each dimension is negatively associated with risk, such that strong objective quality, strong subjective quality, and strong political will reduce the level of risk. We explore the effects of these dimensions and the relationship between them. We discuss two exceptions to the standard thesis that objectively strong design leads to subjectively strong design and ceasefire durability: “spurious agreements,” which are signed by the parties under duress with no intention of honoring them, and preliminary ceasefires, which the parties generally prefer to be objectively weak. We illustrate the conceptual framework through case studies of ceasefires in Sudan and South Sudan.