Affiliation:
1. University of South Dakota , Vermillion, South Dakota , USA
Abstract
Abstract
The definitions of disease proffered by philosophers and medical actors typically require that a state of ill health be linked to some known bodily dysfunction before it is classified as a disease. I argue that such definitions of disease are not fully implementable in current medical discourse and practice. Adhering to the definitions would require that medical actors keep close track of the current state of knowledge on the causes and mechanisms of particular illnesses. Yet, unaddressed problems in medical terminology can make this difficult to do. I show that unrecognized misuse of “heterogeneous,” “biomarker,” and other important health terms—which I call index terms—can misrepresent the current empirical evidence on illness pathophysiology, such that unvalidated illness constructs become mistaken for diseases. Thus, implementing common definitions of disease would require closing this “loophole” in medical discourse. I offer a simple rule that, if followed, could help do just that.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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