A four-party evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavioral strategies in the shipping industry

Abstract

Abstract Global warming and the urgency of environmental issues have brought the issue of carbon emissions in the shipping industry to the forefront. Taking the government, port enterprises, shipping companies, and social and environmental organizations as research subjects, this study delves into the key challenges of carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry. By constructing a complex and dynamic evolutionary game model and conducting data simulations with the help of MATLAB 2016b, we analyze in detail the strategic choices of each party on the emission reduction issue and explore the impact of these choices on the evolution of the system. In this study, we find that the government plays a crucial role in emission reduction regulation. Regulatory strategy and intensity have far-reaching impacts on the development of the whole system, and a flexible and intelligent regulatory system will promote active emission reduction by all parties. In addition, the reputation mechanism of social and environmental organizations plays a significant role in motivating all parties to take the initiative to adopt emission reduction strategies. In terms of economic incentives, we find that the government needs to provide differentiated support according to the characteristics of different enterprises, so that all parties can work together to move towards the emission reduction target. Through this study, we present a comprehensive game analysis of carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry and propose practical recommendations that are valuable to the shipping industry and environmental managers. These findings provide strong policy and action support for realizing the decarbonization of the shipping industry.