Affiliation:
1. School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
Abstract
ABSTRACT
It has been variously claimed that alterations to the human genome for reproductive purposes ought to be prohibited on the basis that doing so is contrary to human dignity. This claim leads to the conclusion that germline genome editing (GGE) ought to be categorically banned in all states committed to upholding human dignity as a right recognized in international human rights documents, and which has been entrenched in the constitutions of many liberal democracies. But is it the case that the right to human dignity is necessarily opposed to GGE? This paper explores this question through critical examination of the concept of human dignity in international human rights, and how it has been interpreted by individual states. Recognizing that the interpretation of human dignity is shaped by cultural context, the paper explores an African perspective on this issue, using South African constitutional jurisprudence on human dignity as an example. It concludes that when viewed through the lens of the African ethic of Ubuntu, there is no justification for a categorical prohibition on GGE, on the grounds that it is contrary to human dignity. This illustrates the need for a global discourse on the regulation on genome editing to be sensitive to varying perspectives—specifically on value-laden questions such as the interpretation of human rights.
Funder
African Health Research Flagship of the University
National Research Foundation
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Law,Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology (miscellaneous),Medicine (miscellaneous)
Cited by
4 articles.
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