Depth and Moral Worth

Author:

Zinkin Melissa

Abstract

Abstract This chapter continues to set the stage for a discussion of moral worth in Kant by addressing two recent accounts of what Kant means by acting from the motive of duty. Julia Markovits and Nomy Arpaly each argue that their view is an improvement on Kant. This chapter argues that they misunderstand Kant, in part, because they think that for Kant acting for the sake of duty is meant only to avoid moral “contingency” and not to avoid moral “precariousness” as well. In order to clarify Kant’s position and defend it, the chapter shows how he would respond to Markovits and Arpaly, and, further, how he would resolve a disagreement between them about whether or not depth of concern contributes to the moral worth of an action. For Kant, the moral worth of an action does indeed involve a depth of moral feeling.

Publisher

Oxford University PressNew York, NY

Reference171 articles.

1. “Kant’s Concept of the Transcendental Object.”;Allison;KantStudien,1968

2. Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

3. Kant's Theory of Freedom

4. Kant's Theory of Taste

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