Symmetry over Strategy

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 5 explores why the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) proved so difficult to negotiate. The chapter addresses the long-standing puzzle in security studies: Why did the “superpowers” continue to arms-race even when a second-strike capability was assured? By tracing the official top-level security discourse via recently declassified archives, the chapter shows the negotiating positions United States took at SALT were primarily legitimated by theories of how domestic and international audiences would respond, rather than what was deemed necessary to deter the Soviets. Moreover, the chapter shows how the theory of status that was eventually settled upon was a downstream consequence of the domestic debate that followed SALT I. In this way, the rules defining international status solidified and crystallized during the process of SALT II, structuring the U.S. negotiating position, slowing down negotiations, and limiting U.S. ability to pursue other strategic objectives.