Affiliation:
1. Institute of Philosophy, University of London , UK
2. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford , UK
Abstract
Abstract
This chapter examines the phenomenon of drawing on meaning: transitions between mental representations seem to depend on or draw on the semantic content of those representations. It argues that there are two distinct ways this occurs. First, some transitions rely only on the logical form of representations and the content of logical concepts (content-general transitions). Second, content-specific transitions rely on the specific, non-logical concepts involved, demonstrating an understanding or grasp of their meaning. For example, inferring that a dog barks by a direct-CS inference relies on drawing on the meaning of the concepts of dog and of barking. The chapter defends and elaborates this distinction and its implications. Representing information explicitly can enable content-general transitions that rely less directly on drawing on content.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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