Irrational Desire

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, it is argued that desire is susceptible to deliberation, i.e. that desires can be formed through deliberation. This opens up the possibility of desires that are irrational, because (as it is argued here) a mental representation admits of irrationality only if it is susceptible to deliberation. Belief, for example, admits of irrationality, because it is susceptible to deliberation, but perceptual experience does not admit of irrationality, because it is not susceptible to deliberation. In defense of the claim that desire is susceptible to deliberation, a theory of “orectic deliberation”—i.e. deliberation about what to desire—and an account of reasoning about non-instrumental value are developed. Doxastic deliberation (deliberation about what to believe) and practical deliberation (deliberation about what to intend) are used as models for orectic deliberation, and the possibility of acedia (believing that something is good without desiring it) is considered as an objection to the possibility of successful orectic deliberation.