Affiliation:
1. Washington University in St. Louis, United States of America (the)
2. Associate Professor of Philosophy
Abstract
Abstract
The problem of nihilism arises because it seems irrational for someone who believes that nothing is good or bad—a “nihilist about value”—to desire anything. In this chapter, it is argued that it is not irrational to desire something you believe is not good. This is a familiar implication of the Humean view that desire does not admit of irrationality, but it is here defended in a way that is consistent with the anti-Humean view that desire is a species of evaluation that admits of irrationality. The argument appeals to an insight from Brentano: a desire for something that is neither good nor bad is not incorrect, but is rather neither correct nor incorrect.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference395 articles.
1. A Theory of Virtue
2. Getting It Right;Ahlstrom-Vij;Philosophical Studies,2013