Abstract
Abstract
First, the implications of the arguments in this book are summarized: nihilism provides elegant solutions to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth; the nihilist solutions are superior to the other responses already in the literature; nihilism is epistemologically superior to theories that posit truths. The conclusion then explains how the book constitutes a challenge to deflationism, and why its arguments weaken the case for positing propositions. Some methodological morals are also drawn. Metaphysicians and philosophers of language sometimes treat semantic paradoxes as annoying technical complications. This work shows that semantic paradoxes are actually valuable pieces of evidence for ontologists and should not be dismissed. Conversely, those working on truth and paradox sometimes treat metaphysics as unimportant, for example, by treating as unimportant what sorts of entities they select as truthbearers. But that attitude is also mistaken: reflection on metaphysics can help us solve a range of paradoxes.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford