Primitivism

Abstract

Abstract Scharp has argued that inconsistency theorists of truth should deny that the concept of truth can be analysed. Since nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, Scharp’s argument threatens nihilism. This chapter shows that Scharp’s argument is illuminating but only establishes a fairly limited conclusion, namely, that there is one type of analysis which inconsistent concepts (such as the concept of truth) cannot receive. It shows that it leaves open the possibility that they can receive another type of analysis. Asay is the leading contemporary defender of the view that the concept of truth cannot be analysed. He offers three arguments for this conclusion. To defend nihilism, the chapter sets out Asay’s arguments and—drawing on discussions earlier in the book—explains where they go wrong. It tries to show that Asay’s arguments rely on flawed assumptions about concepts, quantification, and conceptual analysis.