Truth in philosophy

Abstract

Abstract Since truth-talk is often used in framing philosophical theories, nihilism threatens to trivialize worthwhile debates in philosophy. Two ways to respond this problem are discussed; different ones are appropriate in different cases. As a case study, the chapter examines the role of truth in norms of assertion and belief. It responds to an attack on deflationism made by Bar-On and Simmons. Beginning with the claim that to assert is to present as true, Bar-On and Simmons argue that deflationists cannot accept this analysis of assertion, but have no acceptable alternative analysis. The chapter shows how their argument threatens nihilism as well as deflationism; and it also shows how both nihilists and deflationists can respond to it. Finally, the chapter examines what the phenomena of ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ have to do with nihilism. It shows that nihilism does not legitimize these tendencies—and that the nihilist can condemn these tendencies bitterly.