Emotions as Representational Hedonic States

Abstract

Abstract Part I (Chapters 2–5) develops the core interpretation of Aristotle’s view of emotions as representational pleasures or distresses that form in response to other intentional states that apprehend their objects. This chapter first addresses what Aristotle means when he claims that emotions ‘are accompanied by’ (hepetai) pleasure or pain. Although a few options are available, it is argued that it is at any rate clear that for at least a good range of cases Aristotle thinks that emotions are (at least in part) pleasures or pains. But what sort of pleasures or pains? The view that they are non-representational sensations or feelings is resisted. Instead, it is argued that Aristotle holds that the pleasures or pains of emotions are representational states in their own right (and hence ‘distress’ is better than ‘pain’). The chapter closes by arguing that there should be no general prejudice against such a view.