Emotion and Agency

Abstract

Abstract This chapter explores the Zhuāngzǐ’s ‘Virtuoso View’ of emotion and its connections with human agency, attempting to show that at least one version of a Zhuangist approach to emotion is indeed plausible. It sketches the theoretical foundation for the Virtuoso View, which involves claims about human agency, the self, psychophysical hygiene, the good life, epistemology, and metaphysics. The chapter defends the Virtuoso View against three objections, namely that it abandons intentionality, that it interferes with a good life, and that it yields a schizophrenic conception of agency. The chapter argues that the Virtuoso View is easily intelligible and largely defensible. It reflects a crucial insight into the unavoidable conflict within a self-aware human agent between an internal, engaged perspective and an external, detached one. Certain apparent conflicts arising from the Virtuoso View actually reflect inherent features of the human predicament and thus are not mere conceptual flaws.