Philosophy and the Ordinary

Abstract

Abstract This chapter explores the conception of the Ordinary that can be attributed to Austin and so why and in what sense the language upon which Austin’s method focuses must be ordinary. It argues that using language ordinarily does not necessarily coincide with expressing common-sense beliefs and that philosophy conducted according to the Linguistic Turn is not always sensitive to ordinariness. It characterizes ordinariness in three ways: as the by-default assumption that there are other people with whom we may interact, which lies at the foundations of the social bond; as the by-default assumption that linguistic exchanges are conducted in the framework of conversational cooperation, which enables utterances to convey implicit meaning; and eventually, as one way to fulfil the fidelity requirement mandating consistency between philosophical claims and actual behaviour in ordinary life. It further comments on Austin’s conception of philosophy examining his remarks about the place of philosophy among human cognitive activities and particularly, its relation with science.